Alliance Decision-Making in the South China Sea: Between Allied and Alone by Joseph A Gagliano

Author:Joseph A Gagliano [Gagliano, Joseph A]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Diplomacy, General, Political Science, Treaties
ISBN: 9781351183970
Google: -NmMDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 42451496
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-03-04T00:00:00+00:00

Pre-normalization U.S.–Vietnam relations were colored deeply by the Soviet–Vietnamese relationship. One must be careful, however, not to draw causal lines too clearly between expanding Soviet–Vietnamese ties and the normalization rebuff, or vice versa for that matter, as the relationships between the Soviet Union, United States, China and Vietnam were mutually constitutive. To be sure, Vietnam’s perception of China as a threat from the north motivated it to seek a security patron for regime survival, evidenced primarily by Vietnam’s entry into the CMEA bloc and signing of the Soviet–Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.75 Hanoi subsequently granted base access to Soviet forces, including port calls for naval ships, airstrips for surveillance aircraft, and building military facilities for signals intelligence and electronic sensors.76

While pursuing causation in this respect is chimerical, it is sufficient to understand that the Cold War environment, including the effect of China and Cambodia on geopolitical dynamics, spoiled the possibility of a normalized U.S.–Vietnamese relationship. Once Hanoi began down the path of deeper relations with Moscow, it reduced the potential for rapprochement with Washington; and the further down the path it went, the harder it became to extract itself from Soviet association. By 1980, Vietnam depended on the Soviet Union for twenty percent of its food and one-hundred percent of its weaponry for the Cambodia campaign.77

The quickly evolving Sino-U.S. relationship ahead of China’s 1979 invasion of Vietnam considerably affected U.S.–Vietnamese relations. China was Vietnam’s largest and closest threat, and direct meetings between U.S. and Chinese officials fostered the perception in Hanoi that Washington supported Chinese military action. The Carter administration became implicated when Deng disclosed his intention to invade during a visit to the White House immediately preceding the invasion. Administration officials discussed how they might conceal their foreknowledge, with Secretary of State Vance writing to the President, “If the Chinese were to attack Vietnam shortly after Deng leaves the States, as is possible, we would be viewed as implicated in such action.”78 Even though Carter had tried to dissuade Deng, the circumstance of his foreknowledge was unavoidable. Deng confided to Carter that Beijing intended to invade, and fearing the consequences to the Sino-U.S. relationship from breaking that confidence, administration officials kept the secret.79

As Hanoi expanded military relations with Moscow, the Sino-U.S. relationship deepened, and so did their collusion to isolate Vietnam. During a visit by Vice President Walter Mondale to Beijing, he and Deng candidly discussed coordinated policy to weaken the Hanoi regime. Deng conveyed, “So it is imperative now for all of us to keep up all kinds of pressure on the Vietnamese… On your part you should take political and economic measures; on our part, we will add military pressure and after a certain period of time I can say for sure that a change will take place.”80 Aware of the continued consequences of Sino-U.S. relations on U.S.–Vietnamese relations, Ambassador Leonard Woodcock argued in a telegram to Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke:

Our strong interest in consolidating and expanding our cooperative relations with Beijing at a time

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